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Abstract
We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is inuenced by the
ownership structure of banks, a countrys regulatory environment and its level
of economic development. We nd that corruption in lending is higher when
state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to
the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory
environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality
of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-
controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further
nd that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce
corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but
only for developed countries.
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1 Introduction
Well-functioning banking systems can channel savings to the most productive invest-
ment projects, thereby assuring e¢ cient capital allocation and enhancing economic de-
velopment and growth (see e.g. Levine (1997), Levine (2005)). A potential friction that
could endanger the e¢ ciency of this capital allocation mechanism is corruption aris-
ing in the lending process. Corruption in nancial intermediaries hinders the e¢ cient
allocation of capital to smaller rms, forcing them to abandon protable investment
opportunities and thereby reducing rm growth (Beck et al. (2005)), while rms with
bank connections may have easier access to funding than rms without such ties (Laeven
(2001), Charumilind et al. (2006)). Loans o¤ered to related parties (shareholders of the
bank, their associates and the rms they control) can have higher default rates and
lower recovery rates than unrelated ones (La Porta et al. (2003)). Given the negative
e¤ects of lending corruption on the e¢ cient allocation of capital, rm growth and bank
soundness, it is important to determine the causes of lending corruption in order to
help policymakers better understand how to reduce it. Our study renes and builds
on the existing literature examining these issues, with a particular focus on the role
of ownership characteristics, the regulatory environment and the degree of economic
development of the countries concerned.
Several papers look into the country-level factors that might inuence the occur-
rence of corruption in bankslending decisions, using a rm-level database drawn from
the World Business Environment Survey (World Bank (2000)). Beck et al. (2006) ex-
amine the impact of di¤erent supervisory policies on lending corruption and nd that
powerful supervisory agencies reduce integrity in bank lending, whereas greater private
monitoring of banks decreases lending corruption. Barth et al. (2009) extend that study
and nd that greater competition in banking and information sharing via credit bu-
reaus/registries contribute to reducing lending corruption. Building on these two stud-
ies, Houston et al. (2011) nd that state ownership of media accentuates bank lending
corruption as it decreases the likelihood of corruption being detected and punished.1 A
complementary literature, using loan-level data for particular countries, highlights that
1More recently, Zheng et al. (2013) nd evidence that rms domiciled in collectivistcountries are
more a¤ected by lending corruption than rms in individualistcountries.
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banks are more prone to lending corruption when the controlling owner is the state:
government ownership of banks facilitates the nancing of politically desirable projects
that maximize the private welfare of politicians instead of maximizing social welfare (see
e.g. La Porta et al. (2002), Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005), Khwaja and Mian (2005)).
In line with this political capture view, Houston et al. (2011) nd that government
ownership of banks induces more lending corruption, whereas Beck et al. (2006) do not
observe a signicant relationship between the two; both introduce simple control vari-
ables reecting the prevalence of state owned banks in national banking systems. Barth
et al. (2009) control for private bank ownership instead, arguing that it can help reduce
lending corruption by shaping managerial incentives; they nd only weak support for
greater private bank ownership lowering lending corruption.
Our paper complements this literature by exploring further the linkages between
bank corporate governance and lending corruption. To examine these issues in more
detail, we consider a ner classication of bank ownership type than in previous studies,
by di¤erentiating banking systems according to the amount of credit provided by banks
that are widely held or that are controlled by a single owner. As incentives to extract
private benets of control, such as those related to lending corruption, can vary across
di¤erent types of controlling owners, we investigate if the degree of lending corruption
depends on whether the prevalent controlling bank ownership type in an economy is
either the state, a family, an industrial company, a bank or an institutional investor.
Shareholders who are themselves owned by multiple owners have lower incentives to
extract private benets as these will be diluted among their multiple owners (Villalonga
and Amit (2006)); this is more likely to be the case for banks, industrial rms and mutual
and pension funds. On the other hand, the incentives for private benet extraction are
stronger when the controlling owner is a family or the state, since those are better
able to e¤ectively divert benets to themselves (Claessens et al. (2002), Villalonga and
Amit (2006)). Moreover, banks controlled by owners with multiple business connections
with non-nancial rms might be more readily inclined to engage in lending corruption
(Laeven (2001), La Porta et al. (2003), Charumilind et al. (2006)); this might be the
case for governments, but also for families, industrial companies and banks.
Where controlling owners have incentives to engage in lending corruption and thereby
inuence credit allocations, it becomes of interest to determine if governance by external
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stakeholders, in particular regulators, can curb such behavior. For this, we examine if
the level of monitoring and control imposed by external audits and supervisory actions
can constrain any opportunistic corrupt behavior in the lending process associated with
controlling owners. We also take the investigation further by examining if the level of
economic development of a country has an impact on the relationship between control-
ling ownership and bank lending corruption. Resources available to combat corruption
are more abundant in developed countries (Rose-Ackerman (1999)); however, there are
also more transactions and therefore greater opportunities for corruption in these coun-
tries compared to developing ones (La¤ont (2006)).
In order to study the role of ownership structure on bank lending corruption in
greater detail, we examine a sample of 4693 rms across 51 countries, using survey
data from the World Business Environment Survey (World Bank (2000)) to measure
bank lending corruption. We nd evidence that the ownership structure of banks has
a signicant inuence on corruption in lending. On the one hand, our results show
that rms located in countries where state-owned banks provide a higher proportion of
loans to the economy face higher lending corruption, both in developing and developed
countries with a substantial level of corruption of public o¢ cial. We additionally nd
that family-controlled ownership contributes to increased lending corruption in both
developed and developing countries. Banks, when controlled by industrial companies,
also contribute to increased lending corruption, but only in developed countries. On the
other hand, when banks are controlled by other banks, lending corruption is reduced.
We further nd that banks with a dispersed ownership structure help to decrease cor-
ruption in lending, but only in developed countries. Our results also show that a strong
supervisory regime or a high quality of external audits help to curb bank lending cor-
ruption induced by family-controlled ownership, but do not reduce lending corruption
when banks are controlled by the state or an industrial company.
We thus contribute to the literature examining the causes of bank lending corrup-
tion in several ways. First, we investigate whether the corporate governance of banks
inuences lending corruption by analyzing if controlling ownership is associated with
higher levels of bank corruption, and if this relationship depends on the type of the
controlling shareholder. By examining the two dimensions of ownership concentration
and ownership type, we aim to obtain a better understanding of the underlying mecha-
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nisms at work, to promote better ways of combating and deterring lending corruption.
Second, we examine whether the regulatory environment, through the strength of su-
pervisors and the quality of external audits, can have an impact on the likelihood of
corrupt behavior being detected, and thereby lower the incentives of a banks controlling
shareholder to engage in bank lending corruption. Lastly, we explore whether banks
having controlled ownership has a greater inuence on lending corruption in developing
countries than in developed countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the link
between corporate governance and lending corruption; Section 3 describes our data and
provides denitions of the key variables used in the analysis; Section 4 presents the
methodology we use to conduct our empirical investigation and discusses our results;
Section 5 contains robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes the paper and provides
relevant policy implications.
2 Corporate governance and lending corruption
Corporate governance species the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the
di¤erent participants in the corporation such as shareholders, managers, the board,
and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions
on corporate a¤airs (OECD (1999)). The corporate governance structure of a bank
therefore determines which participants have the power to engage in lending corruption;
those that are able to do so might then trade o¤ the benets from corruption against the
risk of being caught and punished. In this context, lending corruption can be dened
as an arrangement between borrowers and bank decision makers over loan issuance and
lending conditions, where the latter abuse their responsibilities for private ends, such
as immediate or future monetary or non-monetary compensation.
When banksownership structure is widely dispersed, a conict of interest between
managers and shareholders is know to arise (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Managers
can engage in corrupt behavior to maximize their own interest to the detriment of the
one of shareholders. Lending corruption may o¤er the manager the opportunity to ben-
et from immediate monetary (or non-monetary) compensation while it exposes them,
but also the shareholders, to legal risk if the corrupt behavior is detected. Such practices
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can also expose the shareholders to substantial nancial risks as the reputation of banks
amounts to a signicant component of their overall market value. Lending corruption
can furthermore arise from low-level managers and employees such as loan o¢ cers. The
challenge of shareholders is then to give top managers strong incentives to discourage
such corrupt behavior by monitoring and controlling agents inside the bank. It is the
function of the board, through compensation mechanisms and dismissal threats, to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior of the managers and to lead them to maximize shareholder
value (Fama and Jensen (1983)). Another mechanism to control management can be
the market for corporate control: the threat of a hostile takeover can make managers
behave in accordance with the interests of current shareholders (Jensen (1988)). How-
ever, in banking, hostile takeovers are extremely rare (Prowse (1997)), mainly due to
the opacity of banks and the regulatory approval process for mergers and acquisitions
in the banking industry.
These di¤erent corporate mechanisms aiming to rein in managersbehavior are much
less relevant, however, when the ownership structure is concentrated (Davies (2000),
Sáez and Riaño (2013)). Large investors can elect their representative(s) to the board
of directors who will appoint a manager that will act in the interest of these controlling
shareholders. The conict of interest then shifts away frommanagers vs. shareholders to
one of controlling owner vs. minority shareholders. The e¤ect of controlling ownership
on rm value and on the decision to engage in lending corruption depends upon the
trade-o¤ between shared benets of control and any private extraction of rm value
by controlling shareholders. The theoretical literature demonstrates that controlling
owners can impose greater monitoring on management and use their inuence to push
managers to make decisions that increase overall shareholder value and thereby benet
all shareholders; this is the alignment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer
and Vishny (1986)). Under the alignment hypothesis, having a controlling owner might
therefore leave less scope for managers to engage in lending corruption.
However, there can also be private benets of control in the sense that they prot
only controlling owners (Grossman and Hart (1988), Bebchuk (1999), Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002)). When controlling shareholders can engage in actual extraction of
corporate resources, such as through perks, transfer of assets on non-market terms to re-
lated parties, then other shareholders would be a¤ected through the resulting reduction
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in rm value; this is the entrenchment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Under
the entrenchment hypothesis, corrupt lending by controlling shareholders can take dif-
ferent forms. Firstly, they can extract private benets by taking bribes from borrowers
in exchange for loan acceptances and/or preferential terms, while sharing reputational
and nancial costs with the other shareholders if they are caught. Secondly, controlling
shareholders can distort the allocation of funds from non-related borrowers to related
borrowers. Related lending can be benecial for all shareholders (and other stakehold-
ers) if it improves credit allocation e¢ ciency. This can be the case if the uncertainty
about the risk characteristics of projects is reduced by the availability of more informa-
tion on related borrowers (Rajan (1992)). However, a potential for abuse exists when
related borrowers receive favorable terms relative to similarly risky loans to non-related
borrowers, or if controlling shareholders receive private benets such as opportunities to
maintain other transactions with the related borrowers that are benecial to themselves
or related parties (e.g. their privately owned companies). Controlling shareholders then
divert resources from minority shareholders or debtholders to serve their own interest,
in line with the looting (Akerlof et al. (1993)) and tunneling (Johnson et al. (2000))
views.2 The looting view in particular argues that such behavior might be even stronger
in the presence of a deposit insurance system that encourages controlling shareholders
to take excessive risk or make loans to related borrowers on non-market terms, as the
government then bears part or all of the cost of such activities (La Porta et al. (2003)).
When controlling shareholders pursue objectives that are not prot-maximizing but in-
crease their personal utility, the entrenchment hypothesis thus implies that higher levels
of lending corruption may ensue.
As already discussed above, incentives to extract private benets of control, and
to this end to potentially engage in corrupt lending, can vary across di¤erent types of
controlling owners. State-owned banks could be expected to maximize social welfare,
however the "political capture" view stipulates that state-owned banks might be used
by politicians to maximize their own personal objectives instead, by diverting resources
to nance rms having political patronage or to individuals in order to obtain their
political support (see e.g. La Porta et al. (2002), Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005), Khwaja
and Mian (2005)). Families as controlling shareholders of banks might have strong
2Tunneling refers to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder.
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incentives to engage in lending corruption as they can directly benet from any extrac-
tion of private benets (Claessens et al. (2002), Villalonga and Amit (2006)), and as
such the channeling of funds to related rms. Favoritism towards related rms might
also inuence lending decisions in banks controlled by industrial companies, banks and
institutional investors; however, as these might themselves have multiple owners, the
advantages from any private benet extraction might be reduced as they are di¤used
amongst several owners (Villalonga and Amit (2006)). Banks (excluding state-owned
banks) as controlling shareholders of other banks, on the other hand, might be more
reluctant to encourage lending corruption due to the substantial reputational risk at-
tached to such behavior in an already inherently opaque industry.
Whether or not lending corruption is prevalent in a particular banking system should
then depend on whether or not banks generally have a controlling shareholder, and if so if
it is the state, a family, another bank, an industrial rm or an institutional investor. Our
paper contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of lending corruption
by investigating in detail how the prevalent type of controlling shareholder in a banking
system inuences the presence of lending corruption.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
To examine the impact of bank ownership structure on bank lending corruption, we
combine data from several sources: (1) the World Business Environment Survey (World
Bank (2000)) is used to create proxies for bank lending corruption and to control for
rm-level characteristics; (2) BvD Bankscope, Thomson ONE and annual bank reports
are used to construct our bank ownership variables; and (3) the World Banks Bank
Regulation and Supervision Database is used to construct country-level indices on the
regulatory environment of the banking industry.
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) is a survey conducted by the
World Bank in 1999 on 10032 rms from 81 countries on managers perception of
factors that ease or restrain rms performance and growth, including questions on
corruption, economic policy, regulation, infrastructure, nance, and institutional envi-
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ronment.3 This data set is relevant to study bank lending corruption for at least three
reasons, as explained in Beck et al. (2006). Firstly, the survey requests managers to
rank the degree to which corruption in lending is an obstacle for the operation and
growth of their business; this direct information reduces measurement error compared
to proxies constructed from inferred information. Secondly, the surveyed rms display
heterogeneity regarding country of origin, business sector, ownership (public and pri-
vate rms), and size (large proportion of small and medium-sized rms). Thirdly, the
coverage of the data set is excellent, for a large panel of heterogeneous countries and a
broad set of rm-specic characteristics; this allows us to draw appropriate inferences
on the inuence of bank ownership structure on lending corruption.
In addition to these data sets, we further use the World Development Indicators
(The World Bank) to control for macroeconomic factors, and the Economic Freedom
Index of The Heritage Foundation to control for institutional factors that might impact
on the level of lending corruption in a country.
Among the 10032 rm observations included in WBES for 81 countries, we only
keep the 7746 rms for which we have information on the questions concerning lending
corruption and rm characteristics. Once we combine this with the World Banks data-
base on the bank regulatory environment, we end up with a nal sample of 4693 rms
in 51 countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of countries included in our
analysis). The description and data sources of each variable are presented in Table 1,
and Table 2 provides summary statistics on the key variables.
3The World Bank did not conduct another survey giving the same level of detail regarding the
corruption questions after 1999. Even if our analysis is based on a survey carried out only in 1999,
one can argue that the incentives of the di¤erent types of controlling shareholders to engage in lending
corruption did not change over time.
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3.2 Variable construction
As developed in greater detail in Section (4), we will use our data set to estimate
variations/extensions of the following empirical baseline specication
LendingCorruptionij =  + BankOwnershipj
+
X
m
mFirmControlijm +
X
n
nCountryControljn + ij (1)
where the i and j subscripts stand for rm and country, respectively. Lending Corruptionij
is the level of bank lending corruption, Bank Ownershipj represents our bank owner-
ship variables, Firm Controlij are rm control variables, and Country Controlj are
country control and bank regulatory environment variables; the detailed construction
of these variables is described in the following sections.
3.2.1 Bank lending corruption
The WBES survey gives information on the degree to which corruption in bank lending
represents an obstacle to rms. Following Beck et al. (2006), the level of bank lending
corruption (Lending Corruptionij) is measured with a variable taking the values 1 to
4 according to the answer provided by rm i (located in country j) to the following
question: "Is corruption of bank o¢ cials an obstacle for the operation and growth of
your business?", with answers varying between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (a minor obstacle), 3
(a moderate obstacle), and 4 (a major obstacle). Thus, a higher value of this variable
indicates a greater perception of corruption in bank lending. In our sample, 10.61% of
the rms declare bank lending corruption as a major obstacle, 9.97% report that it is a
moderate obstacle, 17.64% respond that it is a minor obstacle, and 61.77% a¢ rm that
lending corruption is not an obstacle to rm growth and operation.
Beck et al. (2006) provide a detailed explanation for why the WBES survey data
should not be biasing the results in favor of our ndings. They argue that if managers
facing the same obstacle respond di¤erently to questions because they are confronted
with di¤erent cultural and institutional environments, such a measurement error would
bias the results against nding, for example, a signicant relationship between control-
ling ownership and lending corruption. To address such a potential bias problem, we
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control for a range of country-specic characteristics as in Beck et al. (2006). Further-
more, existing papers using the same WBES data set show that rmsresponses to the
survey on nancing obstacles more generally are associated with various measurable
outcomes in terms of investment ows, rm growth, institutions, corruption of public
o¢ cials, property rights, access to banking services and operation obstacles (see Beck
et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2009) for a review and discussion). These studies sup-
port the argument that managersresponses to the survey on nancing obstacles are
capturing more than idiosyncratic di¤erences in the perception of lending corruption.
3.2.2 Bank ownership structure
The WBES data set does not provide the details of rmsbank(s). As we are therefore
not able to link individual rmsperception of lending corruption with the ownership
structure of their particular bank(s), we use instead country-level variables to measure
the proportion of credit to the economy provided by banks that are widely held or that
are controlled by a single owner. To match up with the WBES data, we construct our
country-level variables for the year 1999. We include in our sample all types of nancial
intermediaries that provide loans to the economy. BvD Bankscope provides nancial
statement data for 5070 banks in 1999 for the 51 countries included in our analysis.
As for the ownership structure of banks, we combine data from several sources, i.e.
BvD Bankscope, Thomson ONE and hand-collected annual reports, in order to obtain
information as complete as possible. Limiting our sample to banks for which we have
information on their ownership structure, we are left with a nal sample of 1737 banks
(see Table A1 in the Appendix for a breakdown of banks by country). The median data
coverage of our sample, as measured in percent of total loans (or in total assets) in the
wider Bankscope one, lies around 81% (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
In a rst step, we identify banks that have a controlling owner using a control thresh-
old of 50%. This threshold allows to identify when there is only one controlling owner
per bank; we can then consider that the potential decision of such a bank to engage
in lending corruption can be driven by the preferences of its controlling owner. If the
identied controlling shareholder is independent (family or the state), that is, if he is
not controlled by another shareholder, we consider him to be the ultimate controlling
owner. If, however, the controlling shareholder is a nancial or a non-nancial corpo-
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ration, we go deeper to nd its controlling shareholder, that we then consider as the
ultimate controlling shareholder of the bank.4 We calculate our ownership variables
based on the categories of controlling owners for which we are able to identify their
type, behavior and incentives to engage in lending corruption, and for the categories
that hold su¢ cient shares to control the bank (at the 50% level). Consequently, we
end up with ve categories of controlling owners: (i) the government (State); (ii) non-
nancial companies (Industrial); (iii) individual/family investors (Family); (iv) banks
(Bank); and (v) institutional investors - insurance companies, nancial companies and
mutual & pension funds - (Institutional). We further identify banks that are widely
held (Widely), i.e. the ones where the largest owner holds less than 10% of total out-
standing shares.5 We nally create the category Others that regroups: (i) banks that
are neither controlled by a single owner at the 50% level nor widely held at the 10%
level; and (ii) banks that are controlled by foundations, for which we do not know their
incentives to engage in lending corruption.6
In a second step, we calculate the market share of each bank in terms of to-
tal loans provided in its country for the year 1999, dened as total loans of each
bank divided by total loans of the full sample of banks for the country j available
in BvD Bankscope. We then calculate for each country j the proportion of the bank-
ing systems loans, i.e. the sum of loansmarket shares, that is provided by banks
that are: (i) controlled by the State (ShareLoan Statej); (ii) controlled by indus-
trial rms (ShareLoan Industrialj); (iii) controlled by families (ShareLoan Familyj);
(iv) controlled by banks (ShareLoan Bankj); (v) controlled by institutional investors
(ShareLoan Institutionalj); (vi) widely held (ShareLoan Widelyj); and (vii) neither
controlled by a single owner nor widely held using a threshold of 50% and 10%, respec-
tively (ShareLoan Othersj). We also calculate the proportion of loans owned by banks
controlled by the private sector (ShareLoan Privatej) as in Barth et al. (2009), i.e.
banks either controlled by an industrial company, a family, a bank or an institutional
4We use the information provided by BvD Bankscope and Amadeus to identify the ultimate control-
ling shareholder, using a threshold of 50%. For example, we consider that the state is the controlling
shareholder of a bank when its controlling shareholder is another bank which is itself controlled by a
state.
5We also use the thresholds of 20% and 33% as robustness checks to classify banks as widely held;
see Section 5.
6We only have 16 banks controlled by a foundation in our sample of 1737 banks.
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investor.
From Table 2 we observe that banks controlled by other banks provide, on average,
the largest share of credit to the economy (29%) followed by state-owned banks (11%).
Banks controlled by families, industrial companies, institutional investors or widely-held
banks, on the other hand, contribute much less to the nancing of the economy. We
expect countries where a higher proportion of loans are provided by state- or family-
owned banks to display a higher level of lending corruption, whereas countries where
widely-held banks or banks controlled by institutional investors are more prevalent
should have a lower level of lending corruption. The expected impact of other types
of controlling ownership on lending corruption is less clear, though. If the alignment
hypothesis prevails, i.e. if controlling owners impose stronger monitoring on managers,
we expect that countries where banks controlled by other banks or industrial companies
are more common to show lower levels of lending corruption. However, if such controlling
owners divert lending to related borrowers in line with the entrenchment hypothesis,
we expect more lending corruption to occur if larger numbers of banks are controlled
either by industrial companies or other banks.
3.2.3 Regulatory environment
One of our aims is to examine whether the regulatory environment can constrain the
potential lending corruption behavior of banks. Bardhan (1997) argues that the regula-
tory state, with its elaborate system of permits and licences, contributes to producing
corruption. In line with this argument, the political capture view asserts that politicians
and supervisory agencies maximize their own private welfare instead of maximizing so-
cial welfare (Becker (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (2002)). Politicians and supervisory
agencies might therefore use their power to instigate banks to divert funds to politically
connected rms. However, a powerful supervisory agency can contribute to improving
the corporate governance of rms in a context where information and transactions costs
interfere with the incentives and the abilities of private agents to monitor them (Stigler
(1971)). As the banking industry is highly regulated, this is of importance to determine
whether the regulatory environment encourages or curbs bank lending corruption. Beck
et al. (2006), Barth et al. (2009) and Houston et al. (2011) nd a positive relationship
between bank lending corruption and an index measuring the strength of supervisory
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regime, in line with the political capture view.
We rst construct an index for strength of supervisory regime (Supervisory Strengthj)
drawn from the World Banks 2003 Bank Regulation and Supervision Database. It
ranges in principle from zero to ten, and covers capital stringency and powers to inter-
vene in and resolve troubled banks (see the denition in Table 1 for more details). In our
sample, the index has a median of six and ranges from zero to ten. This heterogeneity
comes from di¤erent propensities of regulatory authorities to do on-site examinations
in order to make an overall assessment of banks to determine their economic condition,
and to detect potential opportunistic behavior such as corrupt lending. It also stems
from regulatorsdi¤ering abilities to remove and replace managers and directors or to
force a bank to change its internal organizational structure when problems are detected.
We also construct an index measuring the quality of external audits for each country
(Audit Qualityj) based on the World Banks 2003 Bank Regulation and Supervision
Database. This index takes into account (i) whether there is independent assessment of
the accuracy of nancial statements disclosed to the public, and (ii) whether supervisors
are empowered to take specic actions to prevent and correct problems (see the denition
in Table 1 for more details). The external audit quality index ranges in principle from
zero to eleven; in our sample it has a median of six, with a minimum of three and a
maximum of eight. There is substantial heterogeneity in our sample regarding the role
of supervisors in ensuring the reliability and integrity of the nancial process, depending
on whether they have inuence over the independence of auditors and can take legal
action against them if problems are detected.
We compute the dummy variable d(High Quality Auditj) that takes the value of
one for a country if the index Quality Auditj is greater than the cross-country median,
and zero otherwise, and the dummy variable d(High Supervisory Strengthj) taking
the value of one for a country if the index Supervisory Strengthj is greater than the
cross-country median, and zero otherwise. We expect a negative (positive) sign for these
two variables if the level of monitoring and control imposed by external audits and a
strong supervisory regime can constrain (encourage) opportunistic lending corruption.
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3.2.4 Control variables
We control for a large set of rm- and country-level determinants of lending corruption
to appropriately isolate the role of bank ownership structure in this context.
Firm characteristics We control for rmssize, competitive environment and busi-
ness characteristics. For this we include the natural logarithm of rm sales in USD
(Log(Sales)i) to control for rm size, and the natural logarithm of the number of
competitors that each rm faces (Log(Number Competitors)i) to control for the com-
petitive environment. Larger rms may perceive less lending corruption if they consider
the bribes they have to pay to access bank credit to be of a nominal amount. The re-
gressions also include a dummy variable characterizing whether the rm is an exporter
(d(Exporter)i). We expect d(Exporter)i to be negatively related to lending corruption
if exporting rms can have access to external nance abroad and therefore maintain a
stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis domestic banks.
Barth et al. (2009)) nd a negative relationship between lending corruption and both
government ownership and state ownership. We therefore include the two following
dummy variables to control for the rms ownership type: (i) d(Firm State owned)i
takes the value of one if any government agency or state body holds an equity stake in
the rm, and zero otherwise; (ii) d(Firm Foreign owned)i takes the value of one if any
foreign investors have a nancial stake in the rm, and zero otherwise.
We also incorporate the overall perception of nancing obstacles faced by the rm
as a control variable (General F inancing Obstaclei). We use for that the rm re-
sponses in WBES to the question: "How problematic is nancing for the operation and
growth of your business?", with the answers varying between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (a mi-
nor obstacle), 3 (a moderate obstacle), and 4 (a major obstacle). Including the variable
General F inancing Obstaclei is important to establish that the relationship we nd is
with lending corruption and not with overall complaints about the banking system.
Country controls We further include the Index of Economic Freedom of The Her-
itage Foundation for 1999 (Economic Freedomj) to control for di¤erences in institu-
tions across countries. This index ranges from zero to one hundred taking into account
four broad categories of economic freedom: rule of law (property rights, freedom from
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corruption), limited government (scal freedom, government spending), regulatory e¢ -
ciency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom), and open markets (trade
freedom, investment freedom, nancial freedom). Higher scores indicate that a country
enjoys greater economic freedom, i.e. governments allow the free movement of labor,
capital and goods, and refrain from coercing or constraining liberty beyond what is nec-
essary to protect and maintain it. We also aim to control for the growth rate of GDP per
capita (GDP Growthj) and the ination rate (Inflationj), as rms located in faster
growing countries and more stable monetary environments may face lower nancing
obstacles due to bank corruption. We further control for the level of development, using
the World Bank classication as in Delis (2012) to split the sample into developing and
developed countries.7 Low-income and middle-income economies are referred to as de-
veloping economies (37 countries in our sample) and high-income countries as developed
economies (14 countries). The dummy variable d(HighjDevelopmentj) takes the value
of one if a country is classied as developed and zero otherwise, and we expect a negative
(positive) sign if rms located in developed countries face lower (higher) corruption.
Checking the correlations between rm-level and country-level ownership variables,
we found that only the correlation coe¢ cient betweenEconomic Freedomj and Inflationj
is higher than 0.5 (see Table A2 in the Appendix). We therefore decided to only include
Economic Freedomj, GDP Growthj and d(HighjDevelopmentj) as country-level con-
trol variables in our main regressions, and we introduce Inflationj separately as a
robustness check.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2]
4 Empirical results
4.1 Bank ownership structure and lending corruption
We examine whether countries di¤erences in the level of lending corruption can be
explained by di¤erences in the ownership structure of banks. Countries where banks
7Countries are divided according to GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.
We use the classication of 2000 (as the one of 1999 is not available): low income, $755 or less; lower
middle income, $756 - $2,995; upper middle income, $2,996 - $9,265; and high income,$9,266 or more.
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controlled by one owner play a more prevalent role in the nancing of the economy
might display higher or lower degrees of lending corruption according to the type of
the controlling owner. To explore this impact of bank ownership characteristics on
lending corruption, we consider the following specication (we restate Equation (1) for
convenience)
LendingCorruptionij =  + BankOwnershipj
+
X
m
mFirmControlijm +
X
n
nCountryControljn + ij
where the i and j subscripts indicate rm and country, respectively. Firm control
variables, indexed bym, and country control and bank regulatory environment variables,
indexed by n, are as dened in the previous section.
The bank ownership variables are based on the proportion of loans provided by the
six di¤erent ownership categories of banks considered: widely held or controlled by the
state, a family, an industrial company, another bank or an institutional investor. We
cannot include all the categories of bank together to avoid singular matrix. We rst
include the six categories one by one to analyze the specic inuence of a bank owner-
ship category on lending corruption in comparison with the other ownership categories
considered together (Table 3). We alternatively remove the category state-owned banks
from Equation (1) in order to use state-owned banks as a benchmark (Table 4), as the
link between lending corruption and state ownership is the most established.8
We estimate Equation (1) as an ordered probit model;9 the threshold parameters
and regression coe¢ cients are obtained simultaneously using standard maximum likeli-
hood estimation with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. We can meaningfully
8See e.g. La Porta et al. (2002), Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005) and Khwaja and Mian (2005) that
show that state-owned banks divert resources to nance politically connected rms.
9We formally tested for the possibility that our regulatory environment variables Supervisory
Strengthj and Quality Auditj are endogenous. For this, we ran an instrumental variable version
of Equation (1), where those variables were instrumented by variables commonly used in the literature
(see Beck et al. (2006), Houston et al. (2011)), drawn from Beck et al. (2003). In particular, we in-
strumented using the absolute value of a countrys latitude, ethnic fractionalization, and the length of
time it has been independent, as dened in Table 1. Performing the Smith and Blundell (1986) test of
exogeneity, we overwhelmingly cannot reject the hypothesis that our regulatory environment variables
are exogenous, with p-values ranging between 14% and 98%.
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interpret the coe¢ cient estimates signs and statistical signicance for each indepen-
dent variable; their economic signicance must, however, be gauged by calculating the
marginal probability e¤ects of a one-unit increase in those variables, which we present
predicting the highest category of lending corruption ("major obstacle") for an average
rm in the empirical results obtained in Tables 3 and 4.
Looking now at column 1 of Table 3, our results show that the variable ShareLoan
Statej is positively associated with bank lending corruption, with both a statistically
signicant and positive coe¢ cient and marginal probability e¤ect. This result indicates
that rms located in countries where state-owned banks provide a higher proportion of
credit to the economy face higher lending corruption; this is in line with the political
capture view, discussed in Section 2, which argues that politicians create banks to
channel funds to politically connected rms. While we do not nd a signicant coe¢ cient
associated with the variable ShareLoan Privatej (column 2), our more rened results
show that the inuence of private ownership on bank lending corruption depends on the
particular type of controlling owner. For instance, in countries where the proportion of
loans provided by banks controlled by a family is higher, we also nd an increased level
of lending corruption (column 5). This empirical result is in support of the view that
families divert the allocation of funds to related borrowers when they are in control
of banks, as they might perceive private benets from such opportunistic behavior;
this is in line with the entrenchment hypothesis. Such opportunistic behavior is not
observed for the two other categories of controlling shareholders that might have business
relationships with multiple rms, i.e. industrial companies and banks. We observe that
industrial companiesbank ownership does not have a signicant inuence on corruption
in lending (column 6), whereas having a larger proportion of loans provided by banks
that are controlled by other banks signicantly reduces it (column 3). The latter result is
consistent with banks imposing greater monitoring on management when they control
other banks, leaving less scope for managers to engage in lending corruption; this is
in line with the alignment hypothesis. The reputational risk of having corrupt activity
detected in nancial institutions that a bank controls might have negative repercussions
for its overall market value and business development. Such concerns might also be
essential for institutional investors such as pension or mutual funds; however, our results
show that controlling ownership by such institutional investors does not contribute to
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a reduction in bank lending corruption. Our ndings do, however, indicate that having
widely held banks helps to decrease corruption in lending (column 7). This result is
consistent with the argument that existing corporate mechanisms in place in widely held
banks are e¤ective in encouraging managers to limit and control corrupt bank lending
behavior.10
When we use state-owned banks as a benchmark instead of including the ownership
variables one by one (see Table 4), we nd that lending corruption is higher in countries
where family-owned banks are more prevalent compared to state-owned banks. Our
results further highlight that rms face lower lending corruption in countries where
banks controlled either by a bank, an institutional investor or an industrial company
provide a higher proportion of the credits to the economy compared to countries where
state-owned banks are more common.
The country and rm-level control variables we include in Equation (1) have the
expected sign when signicant. Our ndings suggest that rms that are of larger size,
have more government connections, a stronger bargaining power or that are located
in countries with a higher level of development su¤er less from lending corruption.
Furthermore, the variable General F inancing Obstacle is signicantly and positively
associated with corruption in lending, indicating that our results are not biased by
overall complaints about the banking system. In addition, we nd that rms operating
in countries with a stronger supervisory regime face more lending corruption, in line
with Beck et al. (2006), Barth et al. (2009) and Houston et al. (2011).
Overall, our empirical results show that lending corruption is higher in countries
where family- and state-controlled banks provide a higher proportion of loans to the
economy, whereas banks that are either controlled by other banks or are widely-held
help to signicantly reduce such lending corruption. These results highlight that it
is vitally important for policymakers to internalize the relevance of bank ownership
structure for banksincentives and disposition to engage in lending corruption.
We are now going further by analyzing whether the regulatory environment and the
level of development of a country strengthen or weaken the relationship between the
10Only 25 percent of the widely held banks of our sample are listed on the stock market. Our results
that widely held banks contribute to decrease corruption in lending cannot therefore be attributed to
stronger scrunity by the market.
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ownership structure of banks and lending corruption.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4]
4.2 Factors a¤ecting the link between bank ownership struc-
ture and lending corruption
4.2.1 Regulatory environment
Similarly to Beck et al. (2006), Barth et al. (2009) and Houston et al. (2011), we nd
a positive relationship between the index of strength of supervisory regime and bank
lending corruption, in line with the argument that politicians use regulatory agencies to
induce banks to divert the ow of credit to politically connected rms. Our goal is to go
further by analyzing if the inuence of politicians on bank lending corruption through
the supervisory agency depends on the type of controlling owners. One could argue that
a supervisory agency may be able to inuence lending decisions of a bank controlled
by a single owner only if the latter will receive substantial benet from supporting
politicians. This is much more likely to be the case for state-owned banks (La Porta et al.
(2002), Sapienza (2004), Dinç (2005), Khwaja and Mian (2005)), but not necessarily
the case for the other types of controlling owners (family, industrial companies, banks
and institutional investors). Therefore, the impact of a stronger supervisory regime on
bank lending corruption is not necessarily a clear cut issue when banking systems are
dominated by banks controlled by only one owner. To examine these issues in more
detail, we augment Equation (1) with interaction terms between our bank ownership
variables and a regulatory variable d(regulatory)j as follows
LendingCorruptionij =  + BankOwnershipj
+ BankOwnershipj  d(regulatory)j +
X
m
mFirmControlijm
+
X
n
nCountryControljn + ij (2)
For the regulatory variable d(regulatory)j, we rst consider the dummy variable d(High
Supervisory Strengthj) which discriminates among countries according to the strength
20
of bank supervisory policies. We expect the interaction term Bank Ownershipj d(High
Supervisory Strengthj) to be signicant and negative if a stronger supervisory regime
can constrain corruption in lending in countries where banks controlled by a single
owner are more prevalent, or otherwise positive if the political capture view dominates.
We alternatively use the dummy variable d(High Quality Auditj) which di¤erentiates
countries according to the quality of external audits. We expect a signicant and neg-
ative coe¢ cient of the interaction term Bank Ownershipj  d(High Quality Auditj) if
the level of monitoring and control imposed by external audits and supervisory actions
can curtail corruption in lending in countries where banks controlled by a single owner
are more prevalent. Due to problems of colinearity, we cannot run Equations (2) when
we include all our ownership variables and the interaction terms together. We therefore
include the six di¤erent ownership variables with their interaction terms one by one.
The empirical results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for regressions considering
the strength of the supervisory regime and the quality of external audits, respectively.
Each of these tables has six columns corresponding to the six di¤erent bank owner-
ship variables introduced one by one in Equation (2). The results conrm that rms
located in countries where state-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to
the economy face higher lending corruption; we further nd that such lending corrup-
tion induced by state-controlled ownership is not curbed by either stronger supervisory
regimes or higher quality of external audits. We also nd that countries with a stronger
regulatory environment and a higher proportion of loans provided by banks controlled
by an industrial company display higher levels of lending corruption (noting that the
respective Wald tests are positive and signicant). The two latter results are in line with
the argument of Beck et al. (2006) that politicians can use regulatory agencies to induce
banks to divert the ow of credit to rms that are politically connected. However, this
result does not hold in countries where a higher proportion of loans is provided by banks
controlled by a family or another bank, as for those stronger supervisory regimes or a
higher quality of external audits lead to reduced bank lending corruption. Our results
therefore show that political capture only arises when banks are controlled by the state
or an industrial company, but not in the case of family or bank controlled ownership.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6]
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4.2.2 Level of national income
Corruption is generally seen as a serious issue in developing economies, as resources
available to ght corruption there are scarcer than in developed countries (see e.g. Rose-
Ackerman (1999)). However, La¤ont (2006) argues that opportunities for corruption
might increase with the level of development of countries, as the number of transactions
a¤ected by corruption increases, which could allow the overall amount of corruption
to increase if corruption per transaction remains stable. The impact of the level of
development on corruption may not therefore be a clear cut issue; Dinç (2005) e.g.
nds that state-owned banks located in developing countries facilitate the nancing of
rms that are politically connected through increased lending in election years, whereas
he does not nd evidence of such behavior in developed countries.
We therefore proceed to examine whether the level of lending corruption faced by
rms is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed countries,11 in
particular when state- or family-controlled banks provide a higher proportion of credit
to the economy. For this we augment Equation (1) with interaction terms between our
bank ownership variables and a variable classifying countries according to the level of
their national income as follows
LendingCorruptionij =  + BankOwnershipj
+ BankOwnershipj  d(HighDevelopmentj)
+
X
m
mFirmControlijm +
X
n
nCountryControljn + ij (3)
We use the dummy variable d(HighjDevelopmentj) to di¤erentiate developing and de-
veloped countries. As above, bank ownership variables are introduced one by one to
avoid problems of colinearity; our empirical results are presented in Table 7. Our results
show that rms located in both developing and developed countries face higher lending
corruption when state-owned banks provide a higher proportion of loans to the econ-
omy, but with a stronger impact of state-controlled ownership on lending corruption for
11We observe that in the group of developed (developing) countries, 3.88% (13.22%) of the rms
declare bank lending corruption as a major obstacle, 6.62% (11.27%) report that it is a moderate
obstacle, 15.68% (18.4%) respond that it is a minor obstacle, and 73.58% (57.38%) a¢ rm that lending
corruption is not an obstacle to rm growth and operation.
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the group of developed countries (the respective Wald test is positive and signicant).
These results suggest that the political capture phenomenon associated with state-owned
banks is more pronounced in developed countries. However, if we di¤erentiate devel-
oped and developing countries according to the level of perceived corruption between
public o¢ cials and politicians as measured by the Transparency Internationals Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI),12 the result that state-controlled ownership contributes to
increase lending corruption only holds in countries with a substantial level of corrup-
tion of public o¢ cials (see Table A3 in the Appendix). On the contrary, we nd that
a higher proportion of loans provided by state-owned banks contributes to lower bank
lending corruption in both developed and developing countries presenting a low level of
corruption by public o¢ cials, in line with the "agency view" arguing that governments
seek to maximize social welfare (Sapienza (2004)). These results taken all together sug-
gest that the political capture phenomenon associated with state-owned banks is only
observed in countries with a substantial level of corruption of public o¢ cials.
We further nd that our previous result that the level of lending corruption is higher
in countries where the proportion of loans provided by banks controlled by a family is
higher holds identically for both developing and developed countries. This indicates
that families adopt similar behavior in developing and developed countries by diverting
funds to related borrowers when they control a bank, independently of the level of
development. We also nd that controlling ownership by industrial companies plays a
signicant role for lending corruption only for the group of developed countries. The
latter result suggests that favoritism toward related rms when an industrial company
controls a bank is more likely to occur in developed countries where rms might have
multiple connections with other rms.
Our result that controlled ownership by banks contributes to reduce bank lending
corruption holds in the two group of countries, but does so even more strongly in
developed countries (the respective Wald test is negative and signicant). This is in line
12This index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among
public o¢ cials and politicians. It ranges from zero to ten, with a score of zero representing very high
corruption. We compute a dummy variable d(Low Official Corruptionj) taking the value of one if
the CPI index for a given country is higher than the sample upper quartile (q75). We then augment
Equation (1) with interaction terms between the variable Share Loan Statej and d(Low Official
Corruptionj) and estimate it separately for the two subsamples of developed/developing countries.
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with the argument that banks impose greater control when they control other banks in
order to curtail lending corruption that could have a negative impact on their reputation
if detected. We also nd that having a higher proportion of an economys loans created
by banks that are widely-held helps to decrease corruption in lending only in developed
countries. This result suggests that corporate mechanisms that exist in widely-held
banks to control for the conict of interest between managers and shareholders are
most e¤ective in developed countries.
[Insert Table 7]
4.2.3 Foreign ownership
The link between controlled ownership of banks and corruption in lending might de-
pend on whether the controlling owner is domestic or foreign-based. On the one hand,
it can be argued that foreign owners may be less prone to succumb to local political
pressure and less inclined to lend to local related borrowers. On the other hand, as
domestic banks often have important advantages in terms of knowledge of local cus-
tomers, foreign banks often target more specic market niches to be able to compete
with domestic banks, such as multinational corporations or large domestic rms (Levine
(1996), Clarke et al. (2005), Mian (2006)). They may further use bribery as a strategy
to penetrate these markets: according to the Transparency International Bribe Pay-
ers Index, companies in some of the leading exporting countries are among the most
likely to pay bribes abroad to gain advantages vis-à-vis their competitors (Transparency
International (1999)).
We have three types of controlling owners that can be either domestic or foreign-
based: industrial companies, institutional investors and banks. To allow for the possible
e¤ect of foreign ownership on lending corruption, we augment Equation (1) with the
variable Foreign Loan Propj, which gives the proportion of loans given by banks con-
trolled by one of these three ownership types where that owner is foreign-based.
As above, we introduce bank ownership variables one by one; empirical results are
given in Table 8. Our results conrm that the level of lending corruption is lower in
countries where the proportion of loans provided by banks controlled by other banks is
higher, irrespective of whether the controlling bank is foreign- or domestic-based. This
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would be supportive of the argument that the reputational risk arising from corrupt
behavior is similar irrespective of whether a bank is domestic or foreign-owned. Our
previous result that controlling ownership by institutional investors does not contribute
to a reduction in bank lending is also una¤ected by whether those institutional investors
are foreign- or domestic-based. Lastly, as before, having a larger proportion of loans
provided by banks that are controlled by industrial companies does not a¤ect lending
corruption per se; however, lending corruption is lower the larger the proportion of
foreign industrial companies exerting control. This could be in line with the argument
that foreign industrial companies that control a bank lead to less lending to local related
borrowers for lack of a substantial local network.
[Insert Table 8]
5 Robustness checks
We further check the robustness of our results as discussed in the previous sections in
several ways.13
To address the potential bias problem that we might face if managersresponse to the
questions on corruption depend on cultural and institutional environments, we control
for a large range of country-specic characteristics as in Beck et al. (2006). As some of
these variables are highly correlated with each other, we include them individually in
Equations (1)-(3). We rst incorporate the level of overall banking industry development
(Banking Developmentj), measured by the ratio of credit by banks to the private
sector to GDP as in Beck et al. (2000), with the expectation that more credit provided
by the banking sector should reduce the obstacles to rm growth induced by bank
lending corruption. We then include some of the World Governance Indices composed
by Kaufmann et al. (2006) to control for several dimensions of governance: (i) voice and
accountability (V oice & Accountabilityj) to measure political, civil and human rights;
(ii) government e¤ectiveness (Government Effectivenessj) to consider the competence
of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; (iii) rule of law (Rule of
13We do not include all estimation results discussed in this section; however, they are available on
request.
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Lawj) to measure the quality of contract enforcement and the court system; and (iv)
control of corruption (Control of Corruptionj) to allow for the exercise of public power
for private gain, including corruption and state capture; detailed denitions of these
indices are provided in Table 1. Our empirical results are highly robust regarding the
introduction of these di¤erent variables. As expected, we nd less corruption in lending
in countries where there are higher levels of banking development, higher levels of voice
and accountability, more e¤ective government, better rule of law and better control of
corruption.
We alternatively use a simple probit model instead of an ordered probit one, creating
a dummy variable d(Lending Corruptionij) to proxy bank lending corruption which
takes the value of one if the managers response to the survey is "moderate" or "major"
and zero if the response is "no obstacle" or "minor". This allows us to test the robustness
of our results, as the estimates of the ordered probit model might be invalidated if
outliers in one of the categories with a small number of responses exert an inuence
on the results (Beck et al. (2006)). Using d(Lending Corruptionij) as the dependent
variable and repeating the previous analysis of Section 4 with the probit approach, we
obtain results that are very similar to our previous ndings.
As an alternative proxy measuring the role played by each category of controlled
banks in the economy, we calculate the market share of each bank in terms of total assets.
We then compute for each country the proportion of its banking systems assets that are
owned by banks that are controlled either by the state, a family, a bank, an industrial
company, an institutional investor or that are widely held. We re-run Equations (1)-(3)
with these alternative measures and nd similar results to those obtained before using
the market share in terms of total loans.
In our main regressions, we had restricted our sample to the 51 countries for which
we have information on the bank regulatory environment in the World Banks database.
We re-run Equations (1) and (3) on the larger set of observations we retain when we
do not impose this constraint; this results in a sample of 72 countries, with 6,162 rms
answering the questionnaire on lending corruption, again leading to similar results.
Lastly, we apply two alternative thresholds to identify banks that are widely held; we
alternatively dene banks as widely-held when the largest owner holds less than either
20% or 33% of total outstanding shares. This increases the number of banks classied
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as widely-held rather than being included in the category "Others", but leaves our main
results unchanged. The inuence of widely-held banks on lending corruption turns out
to be not signicant when we use these two higher thresholds, meaning that only banks
with a very dispersed ownership structure can induce lower lending corruption.
6 Conclusion
We empirically examined whether bank lending corruption is inuenced by the owner-
ship structure of banks, the regulatory environment in place and the countrys level of
economic development. We nd that di¤erences in the level of lending corruption faced
by rms can be explained by banks ownership structure. The inuence on lending
corruption of having controlled ownership by a single owner depends on the type of this
owner, the strength of the supervisory regime, the quality of external audits and the
level of development.
On the one hand, we nd that family-controlled ownership contributes to increase
bank lending corruption in both developed and developing countries. This supports the
view that families divert the allocation of funds to related borrowers when they control
banks. We also nd that when banks controlled by the state contribute to a greater
extent to the nancing of the economy, this leads to a higher level of lending corruption
in the two groups of developed and developing countries, but only in countries where
there is a substantial level of corruption of public o¢ cials, in line with the political
capture phenomenon. On the contrary, we nd that state-owned banks contribute
to decrease bank lending corruption when the level of corruption of public o¢ cials is
relatively low, consistent with the argument that governments in this context seek to
maximize social welfare. We furthermore nd that the level of lending corruption is
higher when banks controlled by industrial companies provide a higher proportion of
credit to the economy, but only in the group of developed countries. This result suggests
that preferential treatment toward related rms when an industrial company controls
a bank is more likely to occur in developed countries where rms might have multiple
connections with other rms.
On the other hand, our results show that controlling ownership can help to reduce
lending corruption when banks are controlled by other banks, both in developed and
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developing countries. This is consistent with banks that control another bank exerting
better monitoring on managers than the state or a family; banksreputation has an
important impact on their ability to develop and maintain business, leading to reduced
lending corruption. Our ndings also indicate that having widely held banks helps to
curb corruption in lending, but only for the group of developed countries. This indicates
that the corporate mechanisms existing in developed countries for widely held banks are
e¤ective in encouraging managers to limit and control corrupt bank lending behavior.
We further analyzed if the regulatory environment can help to curb the lending cor-
ruption behavior we observed for banks controlled by the state, a family or an industrial
company. We nd empirical evidence that both the strength of the supervisory regime
and the quality of external audits help to curb lending corruption induced by family-
controlled ownership. However, we nd that lending corruption induced by state- or
industrial company-controlled ownership is not reduced by either stronger supervisory
regimes or higher quality of external audits. These results suggest that banks controlled
either by the state (when there is a substantial level of public o¢ cialscorruption) or
an industrial company divert the ow of credit to rms that are politically connected,
in line with the political capture view.
Our paper has important policy implications. Given that bank lending corruption
can undermine the role of banks in allocating funds e¢ ciently, lead to lower economic
growth and increased nancial instability, policy makers should make every e¤ort to
rein in such behavior. Our investigation demonstrates that corruption in bank lending
is driven in part by the ownership structure of the banking system. Our results suggest
that a way to curb the adverse e¤ects on bank lending corruption of having a family-
controlled ownership is to improve the strength of the supervisory regime and the quality
of external audits. However, as such regulatory constraints do not help to curb lending
corruption induced by state- or industrial company-controlled ownership, a more forceful
way to limit their inuence on misallocation of funds could be to limit the size of the
stake they can hold in a bank.
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Table 1.  Variable definitions and data sources  
Variables Definition  Source 
Dependent variables 
Lending Corruption The degree to which a firm manager views corruption in bank lending 
as an obstacle to a firm’s operation and growth (1-no obstacle, 2- 
minor obstacle, 3- moderate obstacle, 4- major obstacle). 
WBES (2000) 
d(Lending Corruption) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the manager's response 
to the survey is "moderate" or major" and zero if the response is "no 
obstacle" or "minor". 
 
 
Country level bank ownership variables  
ShareLoan State  The proportion of loans provided by banks in which governments hold 
at least 50% of the shares. 
Bankscope, 
Thomson One, 
annual reports 
ShareLoan Industrial  The proportion of loans provided by banks in which industrial 
companies hold at least 50% of the shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Family  The proportion of loans provided by banks in which families hold at 
least 50% of the shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Bank The proportion of loans provided by banks in which other banks hold 
at least 50% of the shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Institutional The proportion of loans provided by banks in which institutional 
investors hold at least 50% of the shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Private The proportion of loans provided by banks in which the private sector 
(industrial companies, families, banks and institutional investors) hold 
at least 50% of the shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Widely The proportion of loans provided by widely held banks, i.e. ones where 
the largest owner holds less than 10% of total outstanding shares. 
ibid. 
ShareLoan Others The proportion of loans provided by banks that are neither controlled 
by a single shareholder at the 50% level nor widely held at the 10% 
level. 
 
Foreign Loan Prop. Bank The proportion of loans provided by banks controlled by other banks 
where those banks are foreign-based. 
ibid. 
Foreign Loan Prop. Industrial The proportion of loans provided by banks controlled by industrial 
companies where those companies are foreign-based. 
ibid. 
Foreign Loan Prop. 
Institutional 
The proportion of loans provided by banks controlled by institutional 
investors where those institutional investors are foreign-based. 
ibid. 
   
   
Banking supervision variables 
Supervisory Strength Index measuring the strength of supervisory regime. The yes/no 
responses to the following questions are coded as 1/0: (1) Does the 
supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any 
presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action 
against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory 
authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 
(5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the 
supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend directors’ decision to distribute: (a) 
Dividends? (b) Bonuses? (c) Management fees? (8) Can the 
supervisory agency legally declare - such that this declaration 
supersedes the rights of bank shareholders - that a bank is insolvent? 
Bank regulation 
and supervision 
database  (The 
World Bank 
2003) 
(9) Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to 
intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights in a problem 
bank? And (10) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can 
the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the 
following: (a) Supersede shareholder rights? (b) Remove and replace 
management? (c) Remove and replace directors? A higher value 
indicates wider and stronger authority for bank supervisors. 
 
 
d(High Supervisory Strength) Dummy variable that takes the value of one for a country if the index 
Supervisory Strength is greater than the cross-country median, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Quality Audit Index measuring the quality of external audits. The yes/no responses to 
the following questions are coded as 1/0: (1) Is an external audit a 
compulsory obligation for banks?; (2) Are auditing practices for banks 
in accordance with international auditing standards?; (3) Is it required 
by the regulators that bank audits be publicly disclosed?; (4) Are 
specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled out?; 
(5) Are auditors licensed or certified?; (6) Do supervisors get a copy of 
the auditor's report?; (7) Does the supervisory agency have the right to 
meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval 
of the bank?; (8) Are auditors required by law to communicate directly 
to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors 
or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse?; (9) Are 
external auditors legally required to report to the supervisory agency 
any other information discovered in an audit that could jeopardize the 
health of a bank? ; (10) Can supervisors take legal action against 
external auditors for negligence?; and (11) Has legal action been taken 
against an auditor in the last 5 years? 
Bank regulation 
and supervision 
database (The 
Wordl Bank 
2003) 
d(High Quality Audit) Dummy variable that takes the value of one for a country if the index 
Quality Audit is greater than the cross-country median, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 
Firm-level variables 
Log(Sales) Natural logarithm of firm sales in USD. WBES (2000) 
   
Log(Number Competitors) Natural logarithm of the number of competitors, which is from the 
survey question “Regarding your firm’s major product line, how many 
competitors do you face in your market?” 
ibid. 
d(Exporter) Dummy variable that equals one if the firm exports, and zero 
otherwise. 
ibid. 
d(Firm State-owned)  Dummy variable that equals one if any government agency or state 
body has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
ibid. 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) Dummy variable that equals one if any foreign company or individual 
has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
ibid. 
General Financing Obstacle The degree to which a firm manager indicates that financing is 
problematic for the operation and growth of the firm (1- no obstacle, 2-
minor obstacle, 3- moderate obstacle, 4- major obstacle). 
ibid. 
   
Country-level variables    
Economic Freedom A country’s overall economic freedom score, given as an average of its 
10 subcomponents, including business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, 
financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labor 
freedom. This index ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher score 
Heritage 
foundation  
indicating that a country is more economically free. Individuals in an 
economically free society would be free and entitled to work, produce, 
consume, and invest in any way they please under a rule of law, with 
their freedom at once both protected and respected by the state. The 
value of this index in 1999 is used. 
GDP Growth Log of GDP per capita in 1999, in USD.  WDI (The 
World Bank) 
Inflation Log difference of consumer price index in 1999 (CPI).  WDI (The 
World Bank) 
d(High Development) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a country is classified as 
developed and zero otherwise (based on the World Bank 
classification). 
The World 
Bank 
 
d(Low Official Corruption) 
 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the Transparency 
International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for a given country is 
higher than the sample upper quartile (q75). The CPI index ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to 
exist among public officials and politicians. It ranges from zero to ten, 
with a score of zero representing very high corruption. The value of 
year 1999 is used in this study. 
 
 
Transparency 
International 
Additional country-level variables 
Banking Development Ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP in 1999. Beck et al 
(2000) 
Voice & Accountability The indicator which measures the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and free media. The value of 
year 1999 is used in this study. Higher values mean greater political 
rights.  
Kaufman et al. 
(2006)  
Government Effectiveness The indicator which measures the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The 
value of year 1999 is used in this study. Higher values mean higher 
quality of public and civil service. 
ibid. 
Rule of Law The indicator which measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. The value of year 1999 is used in 
this study. Higher values mean stronger law and order.  
ibid. 
Control of Corruption The indicator which measures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, and private interests. The value of year 1999 
is used in this study. Higher values indicate better control of 
corruption.  
ibid. 
   
Instrument variables   
Ethnic fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will not 
speak the same language. 
Beck et al 
(2003) 
Independence Percentage of years since 1776 that a country has been independent.  ibid. 
Latitude Absolute value of the latitude of a country’s capital, normalized 
between zero and one.  
ibid. 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics of key variables 
Variables Observations Mean Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Dependent variable       
Lending Corruption 4693 1.69 1.02 1 1 4 
 
Country level bank ownership variables  
ShareLoan State  51 10.78 18.91 0 0.94 79.43 
ShareLoan Industrial  51 4.18 8.27 0 0.18 43.60 
ShareLoan Family  51 5.29 22.00 0 0 100 
ShareLoan Bank 51 29.29 25.76 0 22.26 99.21 
ShareLoan Institutional 51 1.28 3.27 0 0 28.70 
ShareLoan Widely 51 5.25 9.05 0 0.18 46.02 
 
Banking supervision variables 
Supervisory Strength 51 6.18 2.60 0 6 10 
Quality Audit 51 6.21 1.16 3 6 8 
 
Firm-level variables 
Log(Sales) 4693 8.86 7.92 -2.12 9.16 25.33 
Log(Number Competitors) 4693 0.82 0.34 0 0.69 1.39 
d(Exporter) 4693 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
d(Firm State-owned) 4693 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) 4693 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 
General Financing Obstacle 4693 2.72 1.14 1 3 4 
 
Country-level variables   
Economic Freedom 51 60.21 9.47 29.43 59.86 86.91 
GDP Growth 51 2.57 3.95 -7.76 3.08 10.33 
Inflation 51 4.19 0.45 2.27 4.37 4.56 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. 
Table 3.  Bank ownership structure and corruption in lending (ordered probit model, ownership variables are included one by one) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
                                          <type>  = State Private Bank Institutional Family Industrial Widely 
ShareLoan <type> 0.00502*** 0.00053 -0.00322*** -0.00560 0.00549*** -0.00140 -0.00454** 
 (0.000) (0.473) (0.000) (0.233) (0.000) (0.525) (0.043) 
Log(Sales) -0.0101*** -0.00851** -0.0150*** -0.00881*** -0.0117*** -0.00986*** -0.00843*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.363*** -0.369*** -0.357*** -0.367*** -0.353*** -0.368*** -0.366*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0349 -0.0250 -0.0160 -0.0226 -0.0199 -0.0251 -0.0285 
 (0.502) (0.629) (0.757) (0.661) (0.700) (0.628) (0.582) 
d(Exporter) -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.179*** -0.198*** -0.185*** -0.200*** -0.205*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0351 0.0299 0.0524 0.0350 0.0368 0.0309 0.0325 
 (0.568) (0.625) (0.397) (0.568) (0.548) (0.614) (0.595) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.292*** 0.283*** 0.282*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.376*** 0.372*** 0.381*** 0.383*** 0.315*** 0.376*** 0.381*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0729 -0.0435 -0.0532 -0.0422 -0.0683 -0.0363 -0.0491 
 (0.111) (0.338) (0.239) (0.352) (0.134) (0.424) (0.279) 
Economic Freedom 0.00583** 0.00211 0.00549* 0.00256 0.000657 0.00303 0.00184 
 (0.050) (0.487) (0.064) (0.379) (0.822) (0.298) (0.531) 
GDP Growth 0.0372*** 0.0317*** 0.0315*** 0.0324*** 0.0149** 0.0320*** 0.0312*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Development) -0.427*** -0.447*** -0.438*** -0.450*** -0.365*** -0.460*** -0.440*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.0688 0.0662 0.0677 0.0662 0.0695 0.0661 0.0666 
Observations 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Marginal probability effect for 
ShareLoan <type> 
0.00076*** 
(0.000) 
0.00008 
(0.473) 
-0.00049*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00085 
(0.234) 
0.00082*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00021 
(0.526) 
-0.00069** 
(0.042) 
 Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. Marginal effects predict the highest category 
of lending corruption “major obstacle”. 
Table 4. Bank ownership structure and corruption in lending (probit model, the baseline is state-owned 
banks) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
 
  
ShareLoan Bank -0.00293*** 
 (0.004) 
ShareLoan Institutional -0.00542 
 (0.271) 
ShareLoan Family 0.00405*** 
 (0.000) 
ShareLoan Industrial -0.00387 
 (0.113) 
ShareLoan Widely -0.00604** 
 (0.015) 
ShareLoan Other -0.000441 
 (0.625) 
Log(Sales) -0.0156*** 
 (0.000) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.342*** 
 (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0204 
 (0.695) 
d(Exporter) -0.175*** 
 (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0508 
 (0.413) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.290*** 
 (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.335*** 
 (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0721 
 (0.115) 
Economic Freedom 0.00251 
 (0.420) 
GDP Growth 0.0132** 
 (0.028) 
d(High Development) -0.360*** 
 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.0710 
Observations 4693 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 
0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***
Table 5.  Bank ownership structure, supervisory strength and corruption in lending (ordered probit model) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
                                                                       <type>  = State Bank Institutional Family Industrial Widely 
ShareLoan <type> 0.00491*** 0.00811*** 0.0598*** 0.260*** -0.0218*** -0.0130** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
ShareLoan <type>  × d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.000158 -0.0157*** -0.0737*** -0.255*** 0.0283*** 0.0102* 
 (0.938) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) 
Log(Sales) -0.0101*** -0.0148*** -0.00990*** -0.00871*** -0.00696** -0.00858*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.035) (0.007) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.363*** -0.339*** -0.356*** -0.350*** -0.366*** -0.367*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0347 -0.00936 -0.0116 -0.0188 -0.0308 -0.0284 
 (0.506) (0.857) (0.823) (0.716) (0.551) (0.584) 
d(Exporter) -0.192*** -0.162*** -0.197*** -0.190*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0353 0.0399 0.0527 0.0315 0.0168 0.0319 
 (0.565) (0.514) (0.393) (0.605) (0.783) (0.603) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.283*** 0.293*** 0.281*** 0.297*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.375*** 0.830*** 0.459*** 0.368*** 0.294*** 0.341*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0732 0.0224 -0.0910* -0.0459 -0.0939** -0.0540 
 (0.111) (0.632) (0.050) (0.321) (0.046) (0.234) 
Economic Freedom 0.00582* 0.00288 0.00206 -0.000977 0.00292 0.00191 
 (0.050) (0.332) (0.481) (0.740) (0.313) (0.512) 
GDP Growth 0.0372*** 0.0302*** 0.0323*** 0.0205*** 0.0363*** 0.0329*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Development) -0.427*** -0.273*** -0.418*** -0.354*** -0.471*** -0.429*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald Tests  -0.0076*** -0.0139*** 0.0049*** 0.0065*** -0.0029 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.010) (0.245) 
Pseudo R2 0.0688 0.0759 0.0681 0.0717 0.0691 0.0669 
Observations 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Differential marginal probability effect of  
d(High Supervisory Strength) for ShareLoan <type> 
0.0004 
(0.132) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0090***
(0.000) 
-0.0982***
(0.001) 
0.0033***
(0.000) 
0.0008 
(0.241) 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. Marginal effects predict the highest category 
of lending corruption “major obstacle”. Wald tests are only reported if coefficients significant. 
Table 6.  Bank ownership structure, quality of external audit and corruption in lending (ordered probit model) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
                                                             <type>  = State Bank Institutional Family Industrial Widely 
ShareLoan <type> 0.00778*** 0.00455*** 0.00182 0.129*** -0.0293*** -0.0221*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ShareLoan <type>  × d(High Quality Audit) -0.00340 -0.0104*** -0.0142 -0.124*** 0.0371*** 0.0226*** 
 (0.156) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Sales) -0.00993*** -0.0111*** -0.00890*** -0.0132*** -0.00732** -0.00945*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.026) (0.003) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.364*** -0.345*** -0.368*** -0.349*** -0.359*** -0.362*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0383 -0.0217 -0.0235 -0.0175 -0.0284 -0.0360 
 (0.462) (0.675) (0.650) (0.735) (0.582) (0.487) 
d(Exporter) -0.192*** -0.156*** -0.200*** -0.190*** -0.208*** -0.197*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0342 0.0404 0.0269 0.0398 0.0215 0.0286 
 (0.578) (0.509) (0.662) (0.517) (0.726) (0.640) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.295*** 0.279*** 0.280*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.385*** 0.429*** 0.376*** 0.288*** 0.323*** 0.389*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0468 0.256*** -0.0218 0.0220 -0.151*** -0.160*** 
 (0.346) (0.000) (0.651) (0.653) (0.002) (0.003) 
Economic Freedom 0.00622** 0.00417 0.00268 0.00129 0.00315 0.00502* 
 (0.037) (0.166) (0.356) (0.660) (0.276) (0.098) 
GDP Growth 0.0384*** 0.0308*** 0.0317*** 0.0164*** 0.0375*** 0.0380*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Development) -0.435*** -0.475*** -0.452*** -0.357*** -0.469*** -0.482*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald Tests  -0.00589***  0.00539*** 0.00782*** 0.00051 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002) (0.841) 
Pseudo R2       
Observations 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Differential marginal probability effect of  
d(High Quality Audit) for ShareLoan <type> 
-0.000638 
(0.115) 
-0.00155***
(0.000) 
-0.00214 
(0.114) 
-0.0372***
(0.000) 
0.0055***
(0.000) 
0.0036*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. Marginal effects predict the highest category 
of lending corruption “major obstacle”. Wald tests are only reported if coefficients significant. 
Table 7.  Bank ownership structure, level of development and corruption in lending (ordered probit model) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
                                                                   <type>  = State Bank Institutional Family Industrial Widely 
ShareLoan <type> 0.00489*** -0.00259*** -0.00408 0.00549*** -0.00338 -0.00214 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.394) (0.000) (0.142) (0.379) 
ShareLoan <type>  × d(High Development) 0.0148** -0.00402** -0.0166 -0.0125 0.0601*** -0.0165*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.349) (0.984) (0.000) (0.005) 
Log(Sales) -0.0114*** -0.0172*** -0.00895*** -0.0117*** -0.0148*** -0.00581* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.367*** -0.359*** -0.366*** -0.353*** -0.369*** -0.368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0332 -0.0132 -0.0223 -0.0199 -0.0273 -0.0320 
 (0.524) (0.798) (0.666) (0.699) (0.599) (0.537) 
d(Exporter) -0.190*** -0.174*** -0.196*** -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.211*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0303 0.0611 0.0323 0.0367 0.0274 0.0347 
 (0.622) (0.323) (0.599) (0.549) (0.654) (0.572) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.287*** 0.282*** 0.284*** 0.292*** 0.286*** 0.279*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.362*** 0.419*** 0.392*** 0.315*** 0.353*** 0.372*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0678 -0.0773 -0.0479 -0.0683 -0.0218 -0.0506 
 (0.140) (0.103) (0.292) (0.134) (0.635) (0.264) 
Economic Freedom 0.00700** 0.00661** 0.00230 0.000651 0.00650** 0.000510 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.430) (0.824) (0.037) (0.862) 
GDP Growth 0.0367*** 0.0310*** 0.0327*** 0.0149** 0.0308*** 0.0321*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Development) -0.480*** -0.302*** -0.419*** -0.365*** -0.589*** -0.350*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald Tests 0.0196*** -0.00661***     
 (0.007) (0.000)     
Pseudo R2 0.0691 0.0682 0.0663 0.0695 0.0673 0.0673 
Observations 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 4693 
Differential marginal probability effect of  
d(High Quality Audit) for ShareLoan <type> 
0.00131 
(0.188) 
-0.00016 
(0.476) 
-0.00117 
(0.515) 
-0.00156 
(0.975) 
0.00689***
(0.002) 
-0.00134** 
(0.042) 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. Marginal effects predict the highest category 
of lending corruption “major obstacle”. Wald tests are only reported if coefficients significant. 
Table 8.  Bank foreign ownership structure and corruption in lending (ordered probit model) 
 
Dependent variable: Bank lending corruption 
                                                    <type> = Bank Institutional Industrial  
ShareLoan <type> -0.00291*** -0.00608 -0.00158  
 (-3.51) (-1.29) (-0.71)  
Foreign Loan Prop. <type>   -0.000628* -0.000726 -0.000736**  
 (-1.74) (-0.97) (-2.12)  
Log(Sales) -0.0145*** -0.00995*** -0.0101***  
 (-4.22) (-2.87) (-3.08)  
d(Firm State-owned) -0.355*** -0.368*** -0.373***  
 (-5.72) (-5.95) (-6.03)  
d(Firm Foreign-owned) -0.0147 -0.0212 -0.0212  
 (-0.29) (-0.41) (-0.41)  
d(Exporter) -0.182*** -0.194*** -0.200***  
 (-4.58) (-4.86) (-5.05)  
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0546 0.0388 0.0287  
 (0.88) (0.63) (0.47)  
General Financing Obstacle 0.281*** 0.284*** 0.285***  
 (15.97) (16.03) (16.11)  
d(High Supervisory Strength) 0.404*** 0.393*** 0.372***  
 (8.87) (8.68) (8.54)  
d(High Quality Audit) -0.0553 -0.0511 -0.00901  
 (-1.23) (-1.10) (-0.19)  
Economic Freedom 0.00468 0.00274 0.00410  
 (1.57) (0.94) (1.38)  
GDP Growth 0.0309*** 0.0331*** 0.0309***  
 (6.26) (6.55) (5.94)  
d(High Development) -0.419*** -0.450*** -0.483***  
 (-7.80) (-8.56) (-8.90)  
Pseudo R2 0.0681 0.0663 0.0666  
Observations 4693 4693 4693  
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 
0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.  
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1.  Distribution of banks by country  
 
Country 
 
Full sample of 
banks in Bankscope 
Our sample 
of banks 
Percent of total 
loansa 
Percent of total 
asseta 
ALBANIA 7 6 98.97 98.48 
ARGENTINA 93 34 67.50 64.43 
ARMENIA 7 4 50.55 61.80 
AZERBAIJAN 10 7 91.26 88.39 
BELARUS 11 7 7.69 11.80 
BOLIVIA 12 6 77.53 77.63 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVIA 17 12 79.99 79.15 
BOTSWANA 6 6 100 100 
BRAZIL 134 65 86.81 81.84 
BULGARIA 19 18 97.76 98.24 
CAMBODIA 1 1 100 100 
CANADA 59 27 31.15 35.33 
CHILE 24 12 80.22 78.31 
CROATIA 34 26 90.90 92.00 
CZECH REPUBLIC 27 20 75.28 80.38 
EGYPT 41 39 97.25 96.94 
ESTONIA 4 4 100 100 
FRANCE 455 214 56.28 61.07 
GERMANY 2050 226 52.68 51.49 
GHANA 18 13 98.84 96.80 
GUATEMALA 32 4 19.43 19.92 
HONDURAS 13 5 37.80 39.43 
HUNGARY 20 15 80.91 83.64 
INDIA 65 44 78.53 81.06 
ITALY 728 251 53.90 52.36 
KAZAKHSTAN 17 12 94.93 92.92 
KENYA 41 27 87.33 86.20 
LITHUANIA 7 6 99.06 98.78 
MALAYSIA 71 43 60.22 63.56 
MEXICO 48 20 75.94 78.57 
MOLDOVA REP. OF 9 8 98.80 94.97 
NAMIBIA 6 5 88.21 87.90 
NIGERIA 63 48 80.48 82.40 
PANAMA 44 9 44.74 38.94 
PERU 18 10 74.10 74.79 
PHILIPPINES 36 24 87.99 87.25 
POLAND 39 27 83.63 83.48 
PORTUGAL 43 27 73.74 70.35 
ROMANIA 23 20 95.73 92.68 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 74 48 90.80 81.10 
SINGAPORE 50 36 78.77 81.48 
SLOVAKIA 10 8 95.31 92.92 
SLOVENIA 15 11 83.31 80.64 
SOUTH AFRICA 60 37 86.19 88.89 
SPAIN 136 62 55.32 58.58 
SWEDEN 40 25 82.34 83.56 
THAILAND 25 16 79.64 78.17 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 9 7 76.85 80.52 
TURKEY 44 24 89.26 88.82 
UNITED KINGDOM 190 102 75.30 79.87 
VENEZUELA 65 9 59.18 58.49 
Total  5070 1737 Median=80.48 Median=81.7 
a Percent of total loans (total assets) represents total loans (total assets) of banks in our sample divided by total loans 
(total assets) of banks of the full sample of banks provided by BvD Bankscope for the year 1999. 
Table A2. Correlation matrix 
Panel A. Correlation between firm-level variables 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lending Corruption  (1) 1.00       
Log(Sales)  (2) -0.15* 1.00      
d(Firm State-owned  (3) -0.06* -0.22* 1.00     
d(Firm Foreign-owned)  (4) -0.09* 0.26* -0.05* 1.00    
d(Exporter)  (5) -0.12* 0.12* 0.09* 0.26* 1.00   
Log(Number Competitors)  (6) 0.10* -0.41* -0.02 -0.12* -0.06* 1.00  
General Financing Obstacle  (7) 0.25* -0.21* 0.04* -0.15* -0.04* 0.10* 1.00 
 
Panel B.  Correlation between country-level ownership variables  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lending Corruption  (1) 1.00        
ShareLoan State  (2) 0.11* 1.00       
ShareLoan Industrial  (3) -0.04* -0.27* 1.00      
ShareLoan Family  (4) -0.03* 0.07* 0.02 1.00     
ShareLoan Bank  (5) 0.14* -0.13* -0.26* -0.09* 1.00   
ShareLoan Institutional  (6) 0.03 -0.05* -0.07* -0.05* -0.12* 1.00   
ShareLoan Widely  (7) -0.05* -0.14* -0.21* -0.14* -0.14* -0.17* 1.00  
 
Panel C. Correlation between other country- level variables  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lending Corruption  (1) 1.00       
Quality Audit  (2) -0.01 1.00      
Supervisory Strength  (3) 0.08* 0.25* 1.00      
Economic Freedom  (4) -0.13* -0.02 -0.10* 1.00     
GDP Growth  (5) 0.05* -0.17* -0.19* -0.18* 1.00   
Inflation  (6) -0.04* -0.02 0.18* 0.51* 0.23* 1.00  
d(High Development) (7)  -0.19* 0.14 -0.16* 0.48* 0.12* 0.31* 1.00 
 
Bank lending corruption is the response to the question "Is corruption of bank officials an obstacle for the 
operation and growth of your business?" (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3-moderate obstacle, 4-major 
obstacle). Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. State-owned banks, corruption by public officials and corruption in lending (ordered probit 
model) 
 
Dependent variable: Lending corruption 
                                                                        Developed countries Developing countries 
ShareLoan State 0.0573*** 0.00868*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ShareLoan State  × d(Low Official Corruption) -0.221** -0.0217*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) 
Log(Sales) -0.0191** -0.00503 
 (0.033) (0.205) 
d(Firm State-owned) -0.680*** -0.330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
d(Firm Foreign-owned) 0.0328 -0.0793 
 (0.752) (0.195) 
d(Exporter) -0.107 -0.222*** 
 (0.226) (0.000) 
Log(Number Competitors) 0.0352 -0.0231 
 (0.801) (0.738) 
General Financing Obstacle 0.409*** 0.258*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
d(High Supervisory Strength) -0.112 0.482*** 
 (0.511) (0.000) 
d(High Quality Audit) 0.0624 -0.0744 
 (0.664) (0.187) 
Economic Freedom 0.0132 0.00506 
 (0.148) (0.186) 
GDP Growth -0.0880** 0.0350*** 
 (0.043) (0.000) 
d(Low Official Corruption) 0.00278 -0.0448 
 (0.989) (0.469) 
Wald Tests -0.164** -0.0130*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0000) 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.0593 
Observations 1218 3475 
 
 Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in Table 1. P-values are in parentheses, with p < 0.1 
*, 
 p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.  
